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The	Great	Recession	that	officially	began	in	December	2007	nationally	
resulted in a loss of income on the part of many families with chil-
dren who, in turn, relied on a variety of safety nets, including cash 
assistance	 from	 Temporary	Assistance	 for	 Needy	 Families	 (TANF)	
program.	Loss	of	income	has	been	recognized	as	a	major	risk	factor	of	
child	maltreatment,	in	particular	child	neglect.	During	its	2007	reces-
sion,	Arizona	shortened	its	TANF	lifetime	limits	substantially,	which	
resulted in transfer income losses for many families with children on 
TANF.	Using	time-series	analysis,	the	present	study	determines	the	
relative	impact	of	TANF’s	shorter	than	60-month	time	limits	on	Ari-
zona’s child neglect caseload. This paper shows that there is a strong 
inverse relationship between child neglect and the decrease in the 
number	of	 families	receiving	cash	assistance	 from	TANF.	Key	find-
ings reveal that all else constant, under the presence of 36-month time 
limit there was an increase of 190 children substantiated for neglect 
in	 the	 state	 of	Arizona	 (p	 <	 .001).	 The	 corresponding	 figure	 under	
the 24-month lifetime limit was 461 cases per month (p < .001). This 
study reminds us that policies in one program should not be imple-
mented in a vacuum but rather that their consequences for children 
and families in related programs need to be closely analyzed.
Key words: Lifetime limits in Arizona, Child neglect during the Great 
Recession,	Short	lifetime	limits,	TANF	program	and	child	neglect,	loss	
of income and child neglect, substantiated neglect cases
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 The Great Recession that officially began in December 2007 
and ended in June 2009 was the most severe recession in the 
United States since the Depression of the 1930s. Because of this 
major economic downturn, millions of Americans lost their 
market income and relied on a number of federal and state pro-
grams designed to provide people with cash and other bene-
fits when they fall on hard times. One of these programs is the 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program (TANF), 
commonly referred to as “welfare.” This program, as well as its 
predecessor, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 
provides cash assistance to needy families with dependent chil-
dren (Haskins, Albert, & Howard, 2014). 
 In all but 4 states, enrollment in the TANF program increased 
in response to rising unemployment. The average growth rate 
of TANF caseloads during the states’ recessions was about 26 
percent (Albert & Lim, 2017). TANF caseload increases, how-
ever, varied substantially between states, partially because the 
severity of the recession differed significantly between states, 
and partially because of TANF policy shifts which also varied 
across the states (Haskins et al., 2014). The present study focuses 
on Arizona, where during its recession, the unemployment rate 
increased by 209% and the TANF caseload increased by low-
er than average rate of 6%, 11 months after the unemployment 
rate began to increase (Albert & Lim, 2017). Because Arizona 
substantially shortened its lifetime limit policies under TANF, 
Arizona’s TANF caseload began to fall sharply in 2009.
 Some families who lost their market income during the re-
cession turned to TANF; some also lost their transfer income 
because Arizona implemented severe TANF policies. In 2009, 
Arizona cut its benefits by 20% and concurrently stopped pro-
viding benefits to prospective mothers in their third trimester. 
Moreover, Arizona’s policy shifts of cutting its lifetime limits 
from 60 months to 36 months, and then to 24 months, left many 
families with children without their transfer income. 
 Loss of income is recognized as a major risk factor of child 
maltreatment, in particular child neglect. Child neglect is 
viewed as inadequate provision of food, clothing, or other ba-
sic needs to children (Berger & Walfogel, 2011). Loss of TANF 
transfer income may have led to a greater number of child ne-
glect cases during Arizona’s recession. In fact, Arizona’s child 
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neglect caseload increased substantially when the TANF case-
load decreased in response to shorter time limits. 
 This study examines Arizona’s changes in its unemployment 
rate, major TANF policy shifts, and changes in its child neglect 
caseload during its recession. It quantitatively explains trends in 
child neglect using time series analysis that controls for rising 
unemployment, TANF policy shifts, and demographics in Ari-
zona. The findings of the study are important to those interested 
in the relationship between cash assistance enrollment and child 
maltreatment cases. Based the present study’s findings, recom-
mendations are made that could make the TANF program more 
responsive to families in children in the State of Arizona as well 
as other states considering major TANF policy shifts.
Background, Purpose and Questions
Loss	of	Income	and	Child	Neglect:	What	to	Expect
 Existing research differentiates between income levels and 
income loss as correlates of child maltreatment. Researchers 
have long recognized that children living in poverty are at 
higher risk for child maltreatment, particularly child neglect, 
than those living with greater economic resources (Pelton, 2016). 
During recessions, when unemployment rates increase, many 
families experience economic hardship which puts them at a 
higher risk of child neglect. Berger and Walfogel (2011) defined 
child neglect as the “inadequate provision of basic necessities 
such as food, clothing, shelter, supervision, education, or medi-
cal care and in some cases, a failure to meet children’s emotion-
al needs” (p. 5). 
 All in all, level of income has been found to have an inverse 
relationship with the risk for child maltreatment. Loss of income 
also has been identified as one of the major risk factors associ-
ated with child neglect. When a family loses market income or 
income from TANF, the family may be deprived of food, shelter 
or health benefits (Berger & Walfogel, 2011). Families who find 
themselves suddenly not having enough to eat or not having a 
place to live are likely to experience added stress, which may 
lead to child maltreatment (Berger, 2004). Clearly, the loss of 
market income is more common during economic downturns 
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such as the Great Recession, and in turn, it would be expected 
that more caretakers would find themselves under stress and 
unable to provide for their children.
 Berger and Waldfogel (2011) maintain that child maltreat-
ment in families receiving cash or in-kind transfers may actu-
ally decrease, because clearly such income replaces market in-
come and alleviates some of the economic hardships families 
experience. Moreover, and very importantly, often cash assis-
tance or in-kind benefits are conditioned on providing adequate 
care to the children. In turn, the primary caretakers have the 
financial incentives not to maltreat their children because they 
risk losing their public assistance income. For example, under 
welfare rules, TANF recipients are required to provide health 
screenings and immunizations for their children, and they 
must assure that their children are attending school (Kassabi-
an, vericker, Searle, & Murphy, 2011). Such requirements make 
some recipients cautious about providing for their children 
when receiving transfer income. 
 All in all, research suggests that when TANF program be-
comes involved in children’s lives, caretakers experience more 
supervision and basic needs are met. At the very least, child 
neglect should not increase due to TANF benefit receipt during 
a recession. When transfer income is lost for some families who 
do not or cannot replace it with market income, the result may 
be an increase in child neglect caseloads because more fami-
lies are experiencing economic hardship. This study tests the 
hypothesis that child neglect caseloads have an inverse rela-
tionship to public assistance caseloads due to loss of transfer 
income or inability to access it. 
 Most academics and practitioners recognize that economic 
hardship is not the sole risk factor leading to child maltreat-
ment, but it is of major importance. Clearly, poor mental health, 
substance abuse, poor parenting skills on the part of the care-
taker, or lack in disciplinary options also can increase the like-
lihood of child maltreatment (Berger & Waldfogel, 2011). Taken 
together, these personal factors, along with environmental fac-
tors, will affect the likelihood of child neglect occurring.
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Child	Maltreatment	and	Loss	of	Income:	Evidence
 Some research has been devoted to testing the relationship 
between loss of market income and child maltreatment. The find-
ings clearly suggest that market income loss during recessionary 
or non-recessionary periods increases the risk of child maltreat-
ment, particularly if the family does not replace lost income with 
other income (Shook, 1999; Slack, Lee, & Berger, 2007). 
 More income losses are evident when unemployment rates 
are high. In turn, some studies tested the impact of increas-
ing unemployment on child maltreatment. Earlier findings are 
mixed regarding the impact of increasing unemployment on 
child maltreatment. Some analyses of National Incidence Study 
of Child Abuse and Neglect (NIS-4) suggest that children whose 
parents were unemployed experienced two to three times high-
er rates of neglect than those whose parents were employed 
(Sedlak et al., 2010). These findings were consistent with prior 
NIS studies (Sedlak & Broadhurst, 1996). Recent studies, which 
specifically examined the impact of recessions and accompany-
ing job losses, reveal some mixed findings about child maltreat-
ment. One study examined the association between the Great 
Recession and spanking among families with young children. 
This was the first study to examine associations between the 
Great Recession and maternal spanking in a prospective sam-
ple (Brooks-Gunn, Schneider, & Waldfogel, 2013). This study 
revealed that during the Great Recession the risk for being re-
ported for child abuse increased among fragile families. 
 On the other hand, when inspecting aggregate national 
child maltreatment trends during the official Great Recession 
which lasted from 2007 to 2009, the evidence suggests that na-
tional substantiated child maltreatment rates actually declined 
by 2% from 2008 to 2009; specifically, neglect was unchanged 
during that year with an estimated 552,000 substantiated cases, 
or 75.1 per 10,000 (Finkelhor, Jones, & Shattuck, 2009). Over the 
decade from 1990 to 2009, national substantiated neglect rates 
decreased by 10%, physical abuse decreased by 55%, and sex-
ual abuse decreased by 61 percent. Some researchers attribute 
part of the decline in rates to fiscal constraints the child wel-
fare systems faced, changes in reporting practices, investiga-
tion standards, and administrative procedures, rather than real 
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changes in the incidence of child maltreatment (Finkelhor et al., 
2009). While on a national level declines in child maltreatment 
occurred in the face of rising unemployment, not all states faced 
declining child maltreatment while their unemployment was 
rising. As this paper shows, in Arizona, child neglect was in-
creasing while unemployment was rising. 
 One aggregate study used data from seven states, which 
during the official Great Recession (2007 to 2009) experienced 
higher unemployment than the national average, lower labor 
force participation, and higher than average food stamp receipt. 
Taken together, these indicators suggest that a severe recession 
took place in these states (Millett, Lanier, & Drake, 2011). Us-
ing the unemployment rate, labor force participation, and food 
stamp utilization as independent variables to predict child mal-
treatment rates, their findings, with the exception of California, 
did not support a relationship between the economic downturn 
and increasing maltreatment rates. In explaining their findings, 
the authors suggested that it may have been sample selection 
or the fact that not enough time had elapsed since the recession 
started for child maltreatment to surface (Millett, et al., 2011). 
 Some studies paid particular attention to the impact of 
change in transfer income on child maltreatment rather than 
the impact of rising unemployment on maltreatment. Of par-
ticular importance is the experimental study by Cancian, Yang, 
and Slack (2013), which compared an experimental group of 
TANF recipients to a control group in Wisconsin. The exper-
imental group was allowed to keep additional child support 
income and the control group was allowed to keep only part 
of their child support. The modest gain in average income expe-
rienced in the experimental group led to a likewise modest, but 
significant, reduction in screened-in (investigated) child abuse 
and neglect reports over a two-year period.
 Early correlational evidence demonstrates that when a wel-
fare benefit reductions were not offset by other income sources, 
such as market income, the risk of being reported to the child 
welfare system increases (Slack et al., 2007). The most relevant 
to the present study are correlational studies of TANF income 
losses, demonstrating the relation between TANF income loss 
and child maltreatment. One study of TANF families in Ohio 
who left TANF between 1999 and 2002 found that those who 
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left due to lifetime limits or other involuntary reasons were at 
greater risk of child maltreatment in comparison to those who 
left on their own accord, typically due to employment (Beimers 
& Coulton, 2011). The impact of losses from housing assistance, 
as well as other in-kind benefits such as clothing or furniture, 
also increased the risk of substantiated child maltreatment re-
ports (Ryan & Schuerman, 2004). 
 While some evidence suggests that there is a relationship 
between loss of transfer income and child maltreatment, the 
relationship between unemployment rate and aggregate child 
maltreatment is hard to find, particularly on a national level 
and during the official dates of the Great Recession. In other 
words, when the unemployment level increased substantially 
during the Great Recession, child maltreatment on a national 
level did not increase in turn. Perhaps this relationship was not 
witnessed for two reasons. First, the dates of the official reces-
sion did not actually coincide with the dates of unemployment 
growth in many individual states. Evidence strongly suggests 
that the inclusive dates of growth in unemployment dates of 
December 2007 to June 2009 usually did not coincide with 
the dates of unemployment growth in many individual states 
(Haskins et al., 2014). Second, evidence also suggests that there 
is a relationship between transfer income loss due to involun-
tary reasons and child maltreatment (Beimers & Coulton, 2011). 
In light of these two findings, it makes research sense to deter-
mine the relationship between TANF caseload size and the size 
of the child neglect caseload in a single state, rather than the 
relationship between child maltreatment and unemployment 
rate nationwide.
 The present study takes place in Arizona, where drastic 
TANF policy shifts in its lifetime limits meant that many more 
recipients left the program on an involuntary basis and perhaps, 
consistent with earlier findings, more families were at greater 
risk of child maltreatment (Beimers & Coulton, 2011). While it 
was not possible to determine if increases in child neglect in 
Arizona during its recession were the direct result of involun-
tary TANF exits, it is possible to test the relationship between 
the number of families on TANF during Arizona’s recession 
and the number of child cases deemed as neglect by the Child 
Welfare system, while controlling for a number of variables that 
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also can explain the size of the child neglect caseload. This rela-
tionship is tested in the present study.
Study Purpose and Questions
 The primary purpose of this study is to assess whether there 
is a relationship between Arizona’s TANF caseload size and the 
number of substantiated child neglect cases during its recent 
recession. The specific questions addressed in this study are 
as follows. First, what did Arizona’s recent recession look like? 
Second, what were TANF’s major policy shifts and its respon-
siveness to rising unemployment? Third, how does the state of 
Arizona’s child neglect caseload compare to its TANF caseload 
during the recent recession? Fourth, all else constant, what is 
the relative impact of TANF’s shorter than 60-month time limits 
on the Arizona’s child neglect caseload during Arizona’s reces-
sion? In order to answer the last question, a time-series analyt-
ic model is developed that is explained in detail in subsequent 
sections. Data for both child neglect and TANF were used from 
January 2005 to December 2013, the dates of the study period.
 
Arizona’s Unemployment Rate and TANF Caseload
 We used the unemployment rate as the main economic in-
dicator of the recession. In order to compare trends in the un-
employment rate to trends in TANF caseload during Arizona’s 
recession, we used the monthly values of the seasonally adjust-
ed unemployment rate and monthly values of TANF caseload 
from 2005 to 2013. The seasonally adjusted unemployment rate 
values were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
(See local area Unemployment, Statewide Unemployment Rate, 
http://www.bls.gov/lau.) The TANF caseload numbers from 2005 
to 2013 were provided by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).
 During the official national recession, 2007 to 2009, on aver-
age, the rise in unemployment rate nationwide was about 133%, 
whereas the rise in TANF caseload, on average, was 30 percent 
(Haskins et al., 2014). During Arizona’s recession, the unem-
ployment rate grew by 209 percent. Arizona’s unemployment 
rate began increasing substantiality in July 2007 and peaked in 
March 2010, well after the end of the official national recession. 
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Initially, Arizona’s TANF caseload increased in response to the 
increasing unemployment rate by 6 percent.
 Of all the states that had above average increases in the rel-
ative unemployment rate in the far West, Arizona was the only 
one to experience a substantial sudden drop in its TANF case-
load during the period of its rising unemployment rate. Figure 
1 demonstrates the large increase in the unemployment rate in 
Arizona and the subsequent decrease in the TANF caseload.
 Aside from Arizona, there were four other states with above 
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Figure 1. Arizona’s Unemployment Rate and TANF Caseload—December 
1999 to December 2013.
average increases in unemployment rates and decreases in their 
TANF caseloads during their state-level recessions. The TANF 
caseloads in Georgia, Indiana, North Dakota, and Rhode Island 
fell while their unemployment rate was increasing rapidly. Un-
like Arizona, these four states did not experience any increas-
es in their TANF caseloads during the recession. Moreover, in 
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these four states, the TANF caseload was decreasing even prior 
to the recession. Very importantly, Arizona’s TANF caseload 
dropped much more rapidly during its recent recession than 
the caseloads dropped in those four states.
Arizona’s Benefits and Policy Shifts
 The extent to which TANF caseloads decreased during the 
5 states’ recessions may be partially explained by these states’ 
benefit levels. All else constant, a state with higher benefits lev-
els may be more attractive to potential recipients than one that 
offers lower level benefits. In order to compare the 5 states’ ben-
efit levels, we used maximum aid benefit levels for a family of 
three over time.
 The comparison of decreasing benefit levels in real terms 
between the 5 states is found in Table 1. The maximum aid data 
were retrieved from the Urban Institute Welfare Databook (Ur-
ban Institute, n.d.). The Consumer Price Index (CPI-UW) for all 
urban consumers for the Western Region was used to deflate 
the maximum aid variable valued in dollars (U.S. Department 
of Labor, n.d.). During some of the years, geometric monthly es-
timates of the CPI-UW were computed from bimonthly values. 
Additional information about TANF cuts was obtained from 
the Morrison Institute for public policy, at Arizona State Uni-
versity (Reilly & vitek, 2015). 
 As Table 1 shows, in real terms, Arizona’s benefit levels de-
creased much more than its counterparts. Between 2006 and 
2013, Arizona’s benefit levels for a family of three decreased by 
about 32%, whereas the other states’ benefit levels decreased by 
about 15%, after adjusting for inflation (real terms). In Arizo-
na, at least two factors triggered the decrease in benefit levels. 
First, in July 2009, Arizona reduced its maximum cash benefit 
amount for families with children by 20% and stopped provid-
ing benefits to prospective mothers in the third trimester. This 
substantial cut in benefits in nominal terms is a larger cut in the 
purchasing power of recipients than found in the other states. 
Second, maximum aid decreased in real terms for Arizona, as 
well as all other states presented in Table 1. Only in Arizona, 
however, did benefits decrease at the rate of 32%, a rate faster 
than inflation. Thus, Arizona not only decreased in its benefit 
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Real Maximum Aid Jan 1, 2006 to Dec 1, 2013
States with Falling Caseloads During the Recession
(average for 2006 = 100)
State Change Relative Percent Change
Arizona -$114.34 -32.4%
Georgia -$43.67 -15.3%
Indiana -$44.92 -15.3%
North Dakota -$74.40 -15.3%
Rhode Island -$86.41 -15.3%
Note: Maximum aid decreased in real terms for the above states 
which had decreases in the TANF caseloads during their recent 
recessions.
Table 1: States with Falling TANF Caseloads and Rising Unemploy-
ment
levels in nominal terms (by 20%) but also did not keep its ben-
efits matched with inflation during this time period. The other 
states did not cut their benefits in nominal terms, nor did they 
match their benefits with inflation.
 Since the inception of TANF in 1996, some of the most con-
spicuous features of this program have been the states’ lifetime 
limits, work requirements and sanction policies. These policies 
may have kept some applicants off welfare, even when faced 
with serious economic need. Under federal requirements, fami-
lies are no longer eligible for cash assistance with federal monies 
after 60 months of receiving aid. States are allowed to institute 
stricter lifetime time limit policies, requiring families to leave 
the system after receiving benefits for less than 60 months. In 
2010, for example, Connecticut and Delaware had lifetime-limits 
as short as 21 months and 36 months, respectively. During the 
Great Recession, Arizona shortened its lifetime limits, which 
most likely explains the sharp decrease in its TANF caseload. In 
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Figure 2: Arizona’s TANF Caseload and Child Neglect Cases
2010, Arizona shortened its TANF lifetime limits to 36 from 60 
months. A year later, Arizona further shortened its time limits 
to 24 months. A 12-month lifetime limit was implemented in 
Arizona in July 2016. Whereas in 2009 there were 40,000 fam-
ilies on TANF, in 2015 there were 12,000 families. (State-level 
TANF policies were obtained from the Urban Institute Welfare 
Databook [Urban Institute, n.d.].) 
TANF and Child Neglect Caseloads
during the Recession
 Figure 2 demonstrates how Arizona’s substantiated child 
neglect caseload increased while the state’s TANF caseload de-
creased substantially. During the period that Arizona altered 
its lifetime TANF policies, from July 2009 to the end December 
2012, the number of children who were found to be substanti-
ated child neglect cases in the state of Arizona increased from 
313 to 836, an increase of 213 percent. Child neglect data were 
obtained from Cornell University (2015). Cornell University re-
ceives the data from the U.S. Children’s Bureau and stores Child 
Abuse and Neglect (NDACAN) data for every state over time. 
The number of children in Arizona found to be neglected by the 
court is the dependent variable for the present study. Several 
covariates were selected in order to explain the number cases of 
child neglect in Arizona. 
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Analytic Approach
Method: Time-Series Analysis
 Time-series analysis uses data that occur sequentially in 
time. Much like cross-sectional regression analysis, it employs 
explanatory variables as determinants of a dependent variable; 
in this study, the dependent variable is the number of children 
found to be neglected by the court. The longitudinal nature of 
time-series allows for the analysis of the impact of major pro-
gram policy shifts or other external developments in a single 
state such as Arizona.
 When an explanatory variable has a delayed or lingering ef-
fect on the dependent variable, a time-series model may contain 
independent explanatory variables lagged in time. For example, 
an increase in employment opportunities in the marketplace, 
captured by the number of unemployed, would not necessari-
ly have an immediate effect on child neglect caseloads. It may 
take several months for unemployment to impact the size of the 
child neglect caseload.
  Auto-correlation of the residual error term is often present in 
time-series. If auto-correlation is present, the standard errors of 
estimate of the regression coefficients tend to under or overesti-
mate the coefficients, resulting in an unreliable value. This could 
lead to spurious significance or non-significance of the coeffi-
cients. It is, however, often possible to model the auto-correlation 
of the error terms, correcting for their auto-correlation. Such 
correction provides a more accurate estimate of their standard 
error of estimate. In this study, the Durbin-Watson test statistic 
failed to show the presence of positive or negative auto-correlation. 
Thus, there was no need to correct for auto-correlation.
The Model
 Time-series studies vary along the functional form specified 
by the researchers. The present study develops and uses a linear 
model from January 2005 to December 2013, the term for which 
child neglect data were available. The idea underlying the mod-
el is that over the study period, month-to-month changes in the 
child neglect caseload occur in response to changes in external 
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C(t) = bo + b1 UNEMP(t-1) +  b2 UNEMP(t-2) + b3 PY (t) + b4 LIFE-
TIME1(t) + b5 LIFETIME2 (t) + b6 NON-MARITAL BIRTHS (t) + b7 
CHILDPOV (t) + e(t), 
for any t ≥  1, where t = number of months from February 2005
Where,
 C(t)     = substantiated child neglect caseload during month t,
  UNEMP(t-n)    = total unemployment rate in Arizona at month t-n,
  PY(t)      = total payments of TANF maximum aid for a family  
      of three, deflated by the CPI-UW (2006 average =  
      100), at month t,
  LIFETIME1 (t)   = the presence of lifetime time limits of 36 months
 LIFETIME2 (t)   = the presence of life time limits from of 24 months
  NONMARITAL(t)  = the number of non-marital births in the state of
      Arizona, at month t,
 CHILDPOV(t)   = the number children in Arizona who fall under
      the poverty line in the state during the month (t)
 e(t)      = random error term at t.
events, some in TANF policies, as discussed earlier.
 The model presented below is model A from our findings 
section. Some variations of this model are found in models B and 
C, with Child Neglect (C) as a dependent variable in all models.
Dependent Variable and Covariates 
 In the model, the dependent variable is the number of sub-
stantiated child neglect cases in Arizona during any given month 
from 2005 until December 2013. The dependent variable is a func-
tion of a set of covariates as explained below. The data sources for 
each of the variables are found in the following discussions.
Unemployment (UNEMP)
 One of the indicators of the Great Recession is the unem-
ployment rate. As discussed earlier, Arizona’s unemployment 
rate began to increase in July 2007, somewhat sooner than the 
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official recession, and lasted much longer than the official reces-
sion. Moreover, Arizona’s unemployment rate grew during its 
recession by 209%, a much higher rate than the national average 
of 133 percent (Haskins et al., 2014). Clearly, when families lose 
their market income through unemployment, such a loss can 
lead to an inability to provide for children’s basic needs, as well 
as to higher stress levels among caretakers, all factors thought 
to be associated with child neglect. 
 The results of research are mixed concerning the relation-
ship of unemployment and child maltreatment. Some evidence 
from the 1990s suggests that there is a relationship between un-
employment and maltreatment (Albert & Barth, 1996). On the 
other hand, some recent research suggests that such a relation-
ship does not exist (Millett, et al., 2011). In light of the mixed 
findings, the present study integrates a two-month lag of un-
employment rate, expecting that as the unemployment rate in-
creases, the number of children found to be neglected would 
increase as well. 
TANF	Payment	Levels	(PY) 
 As indicated earlier, some research suggests that income 
loss increases the risk of child maltreatment. In particular, the 
evidence demonstrates that when welfare benefit reductions 
were not offset by other income sources (such as another source 
of market income, transfer aid, or in-kind benefits), the risk of 
being reported to the child welfare system increases (Slack et 
al., 2007). 
 When child neglect cases increased in Arizona, some TANF 
families lost their cash transfer income from TANF due to Arizo-
na’s 20% cut in benefit levels during the recession. In addition, Ar-
izona stopped providing benefits to prospective mothers in their 
third trimester. Arizona’s TANF system was not very attractive, 
even prior to such cuts in benefits, in part because benefit levels, 
or payment levels (PY) were not very high in Arizona, since the 
state did not match its TANF payment level with inflation.
 The model incorporates the variable capturing the income 
alternative available to recipients by TANF. We used the max-
imum aid variable (PY) available to a family of three with no 
other income. This variable was deflated by the CPI-UW for the 
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Western Region. The average of CPI-UW for 2006 (2006 = 100) 
was used to deflate variables valued in dollars. 
  All else constant, assuming that income loss among fami-
lies with children may result in the inability to provide children 
with all of their basic needs, it would be expected that the low-
er benefit levels due to inflation or benefit cuts, the higher the 
number of children found to be neglected. This expectation is 
consistent with earlier research that found higher benefit levels 
are associated with lower child maltreatment cases. 
TANF	Lifetime	Limit	Policies	(LIFETIME	1	AND	LIFETIME	2)
 The income loss of TANF benefits on the part of many fam-
ilies with children during Arizona’s recession occurred primar-
ily because of the shorter lifetime limits for TANF participants. 
During its recession, Arizona shortened its lifetime limits twice: 
in 2010, AZ shortened its life time limit to 36 from 60 months. 
This resulted in a steep decline in its TANF caseload. A year later, 
Arizona further shortened its lifetime time limits to 24 months. 
This resulted in an additional drop in its TANF caseload. 
 Some evidence suggests that relying on transfer income 
when there is a loss of market income decreases the chances 
of child welfare involvement because families can provide for 
their children’s basic needs with transfer income and because 
some of their parenting behaviors are overseen by caseworkers. 
It is hypothesized here that the dramatic TANF policy shifts 
and the resulting decline in the Arizona TANF caseloads would 
mean that, all else constant, child neglect in Arizona would in-
crease. Both of these TANF lifetime limits (the decrease from 
60 months to 36 months and the decrease from 36 months to 24 
months) were entered into the model as dummy variables indi-
cating the presence of these lifetime limit policies. 
Non-Marital	Births	(NON-MARITAL) 
 Typically, financial responsibility for children born outside 
marriage rests with the mother, her family, and the govern-
ment. Thus, those who meet the income test are eligible for cash 
public assistance, Medicaid and other government programs 
(this includes the vast majority of unwed mothers) (Plotnick, 
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Garfinkel, Mclanhan, & Ku, 2007). Therefore, it stands to reason 
that as non-marital births increase in the general population, so 
does the number of single parent households and the number 
of families with children in poverty. Since the evidence strongly 
shows that poverty is related to neglect, it also would be ex-
pected that, all else constant, as non-marital births increase, so 
do the number of children found to be neglected in the general 
population. Therefore, a term for non-martial births in the pop-
ulation is entered as a covariate.
Children	in	Poverty	(CHILDPOV)	
  Research strongly suggests that child maltreatment is cor-
related with aggregate community or state-level poverty rates 
(Coulton, Crampton, Irwin, Spilsbury, & korbin, 2007; Coulton, 
korbin, Su, & Chow, 2008; Drake & Pandey, 1996; Jones & Mc-
Curdy, 1992; Pelton, 2015; Sedlak & Broadhurst, 1996; Sedlak et 
al., 2010). Cross-sectional evidence reveals that families of low 
socioeconomic status were five times more likely to experience 
child maltreatment than families of higher socioeconomic sta-
tus (Sedlak et al., 2010). 
 In light of such strong evidence, it is hypothesized that all 
else constant, as the number of children in poverty in the pop-
ulation increases, the number of children found to be neglected 
in the system also increases. 
Findings and Limitations
 Table 2 presents findings associated with the time series 
multivariate analyses component of the study. The table pres-
ents three alternate configurations of a model with a dependent 
variable capturing the number of cases substantiated for child 
neglect and where all independent variables are statistically 
significant (p. < .05) and have the expected sign. The overall R2 
across the three models is at least 72 percent. Thus, in the three 
models, the covariates explain at least 72% of the variance in 
the dependent variable. The following provides specific expla-
nations of the time series results. 
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Model A Model B  Model C
Lifetime limit from 60 Lifetime limit from 60  TANF (t) 
to 36 months (t) to 36 months (t)
190 *** 224 ***  -0.00792 *** 
  
Lifetime limit from 36  Lifetime limit from 36  Lifetime limit from 36
to 24 months (t) to 24 months (t)  to 24 months (t)
461 ***  477 ***   264 *** 
Unemployment Rate (t-1)  _________________  TANF benefit cut
     67 ***
-108 **
Unemployment Rate (t-2) _________________   _________________
113 **
 
F(5, 90) = 65.53 F(2, 93) = 129.8   F(3, 92) = 80.45
P < 0.00005 P < 0.00005  P < 0.00005 
R2 = 0.79 R2 = 0.74  R2 = 0.72
N= 96 N= 96   N= 96
*** p < 0.0001
**  p < 0.01
Table 2: Time-Series Analyses Findings
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Impact	of	TANF	Lifetime	Limit	Policies
 Table 2 presents two models that show the impact of the 
TANF short time limit policies of 36 and 24 months on child 
neglect (models A and B). In model A, the effect of the 36-month 
lifetime limit variable means that under the presence of 
36-month time limit, which lasted for a year, there was an in-
crease of 190 children substantiated for neglect in the state of 
Arizona (p < 0.0001). The corresponding figure in model B was 
224 children (p < 0.0001). The impact of the 36-month time limit 
lasted for about a year, while the impact of the 24-month time 
limit lasted until the end of the study period. All else constant, 
the monthly impact of the 24-month time limit was larger, in-
creasing the number of neglect cases by 461 cases per month in 
model A and 477 cases per month in Model B. 
 The third model in the table does not have the 36-month 
lifetime time limit changes. However, it does have the TANF 
caseload, which, of course, fluctuates in response to policy 
changes over time. During the study period before Arizona im-
posed the benefit cuts and the lifetime limits, its TANF caseload 
averaged 38,630 cases per month. After the imposition of the 
benefit cuts and the lifetime limits, its caseload averaged 18,460 
cases, resulting in a difference of 20,170 cases. The coefficient 
corresponding to the TANF caseload in Model C suggests that 
a decrease of 20,170 fewer families on public assistance (TANF) 
results in an increase of 160 children substantiated for neglect 
each month. After the benefit cuts and the lower lifetime limits, 
the average number of monthly substantiated cases was 737 
cases, of which 160 cases (21.7%) are associated with fewer fam-
ilies receiving TANF. All else equal, this study suggests that the 
decrease in Arizona’s TANF caseload had a substantial effect on 
neglect cases.
 Model C further suggests that under the 24-month life-
time limits, the number of children substantiated for neglect 
increased by 264 cases. In addition, the 20% cuts in TANF 
benefits (which also meant that benefits were eliminated for 
many pregnant women) meant that 67 more children per month 
in Arizona were found neglected by the courts, all else constant. 
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Economic	and	Other	Environmental	Factors
 Only Model A integrated the unemployment variable in the 
model as an explanatory variable. When the unemployment 
variable is taken out of the model in Model B, it is obvious that 
unemployment does not contribute much to explaining the de-
pendent variable, the number of children neglected in Arizona. 
The percentage of the variance explained by the variables in 
model A with the unemployment rate is 79 percent, whereas 
the corresponding figure without the unemployment rate in 
Model B is 74 percent. In model A, the unemployment variable 
is lagged two months, which means that, taken together, two 
months in the past, all else equal, an increase in the unemploy-
ment rate of 1% is associated with 5 more substantiated neglect 
cases. The other variables, such as non-marital births, were left 
out of the final models because they did not add to the models 
nor were they statistically significant.
Limitations
 The present study was designed to show whether a rela-
tionship exists between the number of families enrolled in the 
TANF program and number of neglected children in Arizona 
during its recession. The study suffers from several limitations 
that need to be addressed. First, since the study was conduct-
ed in a single state, it is not possible to determine whether the 
same effects would have been found elsewhere. Yet, because 
states differ so much with regards to their TANF policies and 
programs, a single state analysis was warranted. Arizona im-
plemented two drastic lifetime limits during its recession. These 
two drastic changes, which took place very close to one another 
during the recession, were unique to Arizona. 
 The second limitation of the study is that it was not able to 
show that increases in child neglect caseloads in during the re-
cession came from the potentially eligible population of TANF 
recipients or former recipients who left on involuntary basis 
due to lifetime limits. It was impossible to address this with the 
data in hand. We would have been able to address this if we had 
micro-level data (data on each individual/household). 
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 Third, it should be acknowledged that other policies and 
practices of Arizona could have affected the size of child ne-
glect caseloads, and these variables are not controlled for in this 
study. We integrated variables which have shown to be correlat-
ed with child maltreatment in earlier studies and those which 
we could realistically obtain. 
 Finally, the study did not determine the differential impact 
of TANF on child neglect across poverty levels, race or ethnici-
ty, and other demographics. Such detailed analysis is warrant-
ed when future studies are conducted in this area.
Discussion
 To-date, most evidence strongly suggests that national trends 
in child maltreatment were not affected by rising unemployment 
rate during the Great Recession, mainly because national neglect 
cases dropped from 1990 to 2009 by 10%, physical abuse cases 
dropped by 55% and sexual abuse cases dropped by 61 percent 
(Finkelhor, et al., 2009). Yet, the present study shows that in Ar-
izona, state child maltreatment actually increased during its re-
cession, and this increase is primarily linked to Arizona’s drastic 
changes in its TANF policies. 
 Some researchers attribute the downward national trends 
in child maltreatment in recent years, particularly in the face of 
economic downturn, as a response to the downsizing of some 
child welfare systems or in response to state fiscal constraints 
(Sell, Zlotnic, Noonan, & Rubin, 2010). One mistake made by 
most earlier research, however, is examining national child wel-
fare trends and national economic trends rather than focusing 
on state-level child welfare trends and recessions. The Great Re-
cession did not impact all states or localities equally, and num-
bers of child maltreatment cases responded differently based 
upon their state’s recession. 
 Furthermore, rather than attempt to correlate unemploy-
ment with child maltreatment, it appears that closer attention 
should be paid to the role that safety nets play in protecting the 
well-being of families and children during recessionary periods 
and to understand the impact that these safety nets have on 
child welfare involvement. Many children in the child welfare 
system are from public assistance eligible homes. Since the loss 
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in income from TANF can be important to families, child mal-
treatment may be more of a response to loss in income from 
major safety nets rather than child neglect’s responsiveness to 
general economic trends. This paper shows that there is a strong 
inverse relationship between child neglect and a decrease in the 
number of families receiving cash assistance from TANF. 
 The reduction of the number of cases on the TANF rolls 
through time limits or reduction in benefit levels have been wit-
nessed nationwide throughout recent years. Arizona, however, 
has been a national leader in reducing the number of families 
receiving TANF and in reducing the benefit levels for low-in-
come families with children (Reilly & vitek, 2015). Nationwide, 
the original goals of TANF of workforce training, cash assis-
tance, and childcare assistance receive considerably less atten-
tion now than they have over the years. At TANF’s inception in 
1996, nationwide, 70% of TANF’s federal and state monies were 
directed for basic assistance for poor families. By 2014, that fig-
ure was 26 percent (Schott, Pavetti, & Floyd, 2015).
 Evidence reveals that since 1998, Arizona funded its TANF 
program at lower rates than it had done in previous years, in-
stead putting TANF money into child welfare as well as other 
programs. In Arizona, in 1998, 90% of TANF funds were target-
ed towards activities such as cash assistance, job preparation, 
and childcare assistance to aid in moving poor families with 
children out of poverty and into employment (Reilly & vitek, 
2015). In 2015, the corresponding figure was about 30% of TANF 
funds. During this same time frame, TANF funds allocated 
to support child welfare programs grew from 6% to over 64% 
(Reilly & Vitek, 2015). The reduced benefits for poor families 
with children under TANF demonstrates that the efficacy of 
TANF as a safety net was substantially weakened, essentially 
leaving caretakers with little income to support their families’ 
basic needs. The shifting of resources to child welfare may have 
meant that there was a shifting of responsibilities of services 
from TANF to child welfare.
 Numerous TANF programs nationwide were not account-
able enough for their block grants over the years (Schott et al., 
2015). The fact that block grant money did not keep up with in-
flation and thus kept on losing its value over time in real terms, 
and the fact that monies were diverted to other programs, left 
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some states with few resources to meet rising demands for cash 
assistance during the recession. Having fewer resources during 
the recession gave Arizona some justification for the shortening 
of its TANF time limits. 
 This study reminds us that policies in one program should 
not be implemented in a vacuum, but rather that their conse-
quences for children and families in related programs need to 
be closely analyzed. During economic downturns, in partic-
ular, the federal government should discourage severe policy 
changes such as the shortened time limits implemented by Ar-
izona. States should be encouraged by the federal government 
to be more generous to families with children during recessions 
by relaxing their strict policies rather than keeping or institut-
ing more severe and demanding policies. The federal govern-
ment needs to help states financially, as it did with the Stimulus 
bill passed by Congress in 2009, that most TANF directors be-
lieved adequately allowed states to help many families in need 
(Haskins et al., 2014). Such financial support may stop states 
such as Arizona from passing drastic measures to shorten its 
lifetime TANF limits during recessions to avoid increases in 
child neglect caseloads.
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